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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

CAN A MANUFACTUR
BE COMPELLED TO SEr,?-The fight for price maintenance is not yet completely settled, despite, the decisions in Dr. Miles
Medical Company v. Parks &.Sois Company, 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376,
55 L. Ed. 5o2, and Baiter & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 6x6,
58 L. Ed. io4i, which held invalid' contracts, whether nominally of agency,
or of sale, between manufacturer and wholesaler or jobber whereby the
latter in purchasing agreed himself to maintain and to sell only to others
who would maintain a schedule of prices established by the manufacturer.
But there are more ways than one of maintaining prices.
One of these
is to refuse to sell to persons who do not in fact maintain the established
and "recommended" schedule. Can the legislature or can the courts compel
a manufacturer to sell to any-person who offers the price? The first of
these questions is suggested and the second raised for decision in the case
of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat'Co., 227 Fed. 46,
decided November 1o, 1915, by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the 2nd Circuit.
The precise question in that case was "Did Sec. 2 of the CLAYTON ACT
(Act Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730) make the defendant's published
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scheme of sales, which involved a schedule of prices, a recommendation
and request to wholesalers to resell only at specified retail prices, and a
declaration that the defendant manufacturer would sell only to wholesalers
illegal as creating an actual monopoly of and lessening competition in
Cream of Wheat?"* On the theory that defendant's practices were thus
made illegal the plaintiff asked that defendant be enjoined and prohibited
from enforcing and, carrying out its system of sales * * * and from
thereby in any manner cutting off the plaintiff's supply of Cream of Wheat.
The District Court denied the injunction in an opinion filed July 2o,
1915, in 224 Fed. 566. This decision the Circuit Court of Appeals has now
affirmed in a brief opinion -written by Judge LACOMBE, which so far as expressed accepts the views declared by Judge HOUGH of the District Court.
Both opinions dwell upon the fact that Cream of Wheat is little more
than a name applied' under authority of the Trademark Laws to what are
known as "middlings". Middlings are a grade of wheat which the defendant buys, cleans and puts up without subjecting to any other process, in packages with the name indicated. Defendant buys less than io
of the middlings crop of the country and there is nothing "to prevent as
many others as may desire from buying and selling as much as they please.
Hence there is nothing approaching a monopoly about the business except
in the use of the name, and for this of course the defendant has authority
under the laws of the United States. The Circuit Court of Appeals concludes its opinion with the following statement: "Before the SHERI AN
Act it was the law that a trader might reject the offer of a proposing buyer
for any reason that appealed to him; it might be because he did not like
the other's business methods, or because he had had some personal difference with him, political, racial or social. That was purely his own
affair, with which nobody else had any concern. Neither the SHERMAN
Act nor any decision of the Supreme Court construing the same, nor the
CLAYTON AcT, has changed, the law in this particular. We have not yet.
reached the stage where the selection of a trader's customers is made
for him by the government."
The plaintiff, it should be remarked, is a corporation owning a chain
of stores to the number of more than iooo extending across the country,
selling merchandise with a minimum of service and overhead charge at
prices lower than the ordinary grocery store could compete with and live.
The company is not a "wholesaler" but despite that fact had been supplied
by the defendant company with Cream of ,Wheat at the established prices
until because of its persistent cutting of retail prices the continuance of
the supply was cut off by defendant.
The effect of the decision is that § 2 of the CLAYTON AcT, which makes
it unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to discriminate in price
between different purchasers where the effect of such discrimination may
The fact that the Tea Company was a retailer and that the Wheat Company had chosen to treat it as an exception to its own published plan of
sales was disregarded.
*
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be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, with
the proviso that nothing in said Act contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade, does not compel manufacturers to sell
contrary to their will their products, the only monopolistic feature of
which is a registered trade-mark and name. The decision seems sound.
Defendant had a monopoly in Cream of Wheat, to be sure, but that was
in reality a monopoly only in the use of that name. It had no monopol)
and was not attempting to acquire one, or even to diminish or restrain trade
in purified middlings, and Cream of Wheat is nothing in the world but
A contrary decision certainly would have prevented
purified middlings.
defendant from "selecting its own customers."
An interesting suggestion regarding the situation developed in this case
is made in 29 HARVARD LAW RtvIEw, 77. The writer relies upon the common
law principle that intentional damage without justification is actionable.
On similar grounds it is claimed injury by a manufacturer against a
retailer by means of a discrimination whose purpose is illegal restraint of
trade should be actionable. It is then suggested that the CLAYTON ACT
which now makes it illegal "to discriminate in price" (§2) and therefore
does not cover discrimination by refusal to sell at any price, be so amended
as to prohibit discrimination of any kind among customers for the purpose of restraining trade.
Such statutory provisions doubtless would accomplish the purpose indicated. Would the statute then be constitutional? Perhaps the presumptions which attach in favor of legislation and the reserve which our better
courts properly have been exercising during the last few years in considering
at all the policy of legislation would result in the sustaining of such a law.
The policy of such a law certainly is open to serious question. The just
criticism of many American courts for setting aside legislation, in a
juristic period already -ending, has resulted apparently in a mad impulse
to justify any kind of legislation supposedly in the social interest if only
it imposes some kind of prohibition, limitation or restraint upon a corporation or other successful enterprise. But why, in what Justice HoL-ass
in his dissenting opinion in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U. S. 373, 411, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 386, 55 L. Ed. 502, 520, characterizes as "even the present enthusiasm for regulating prices to be
'harged by other people," should the Wheat Company be obliged to sell
its product to the Tea Company? What social good would result? The
Tea Company would be enabled without sufficient consideration to utilize
the trade name, the good will, the reputation for high grade and honest
goods which the Wheat Company has built up by the exercise of high business ability, honesty, energy, and the expenditure of large sums of money
in advertising. How would the Tea Company use this control over the
name and good will of the Wheat Company, for certainly it would have
such control under the proposed statute? By selling Cream of Wheat to
its customers at a reduced price of course for the purpose of attracting
buyers to its store, many of them led there by the false belief that because
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Cream of Wheat, with its established quality and price, is sold below cost
other articles and commodities will be also. The Tea Company profits,
those of its customers who buy Cream of Wheat profit temporarily and
to some extent, but probably a large number of them purchase other goods
under the mistaken impression created as indicated that they are buying them
too below cost. Is this a net social good? It is difficult to see it. There
is nothing to prevent the Tea Company from selling purified wheat middlings
at any price it may see fit or from putting them up in attractive packages
with an attractive name. The final result not improbably would be to
make it impossible for ordinary retailers to carry these goods (and if
these, ultimately almost any established and well known products), thus perhaps demoralizing retail trade, crippling manufactures -with ultimate approach
That might conceivably be a
to, instead of prevention of monopoly.
desirable result, but it certainly is not within the purview of a statute to
prevent monopoly and restraint of trade. The case would be otherwise
concerning commodities for which there is no acceptable equivalent, conH. M. B.
verted into monopoly by patent or other laws.
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